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The Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957 was tasked to draft the 
constitution for an independent Malaya and one of the terms of reference 
stated:
To make recommendations for a federal form of constitution 
for the whole country as a single, self-governing unit within 
the Commonwealth based on Parliamentary democracy with a 
bicameral legislature, which would include provision for: 
i. the establishment of a strong central government with the 
States and Settlements enjoying a measure of autonomy (the 
question of the residual legislative power to be examined by, 
and to the subject of recommendations by the Commission) 
and with machinery for consultation between the central 
Government and the States and Settlements on certain 
financial matters to be specified in the Constitution;…1
Federalism is a basic concept of the Constitution of Malaysia. The terms 
of reference sought to confer the federal government with significant 
centralised powers and to ensure the union of the states in the new 
Federation of Malaya (Persekutuan Tanah Melayu) in 1957, which six 
years later was renamed Malaysia. Federalism is ‘the method of dividing 
1 Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, Colonial No. 330, London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1957.
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powers so that the general and regional governments are each within a 
sphere, co-ordinate and independent.’2 Although the federal and state 
governments have some autonomy, their activities, administrations and 
policies are coordinated. They are equal within a federal system and adhere 
to the division of powers in the supreme written federal constitution 
and the states cannot be coerced or forced by the federal authorities. 
However, in practising federalism, Malaysia has experienced varying 
degrees of uncertainty and confusion, and at times conflicts, coercion 
and compromise. The chapter in the beginning touches on the confusion 
over the method of admission of new member states into Malaysia. It will 
be shown that coercive means are available to the federal government in 
dealing with ‘unfriendly’ states by virtue of the overwhelming control of 
the ruling coalition since independence with the support of the former 
colonial power and the traditional ruling elite. Even so, the ruling coalition 
has been weakened with the recent political setbacks. The continuance of a 
strong-arm attitude by the federal ruling coalition may cause more conflicts 
with the states and further erode whatever dwindling support that it has. It 
is believed that the ruling federal authority may adopt a more diplomatic 
stance towards the states to reach an amicable compromise.  
A FEW IDEAS ON FEDERALISMS AND FEDERATIONS
A federation is formed when several independent states are federally united 
because they are not fit or disposed to line under one unified government.3 
2 K. C. Wheare, Federal Government (4th edn), London, Oxford University Press, 1953, p.10.
3 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, London, Longman, Greene & Co. Ltd., 
1926, p.124.
In this sense, federalism can be perceived as an intermediate between two 
extremes, balkanisation breaking up into smaller independent states and 
forming a large single state,4 or in the words of William P. Maddox, a perfect 
balance or compromise between the extremes.5 
The relationship between federal and state governments in a federal system 
is different compared to the relationship established in a unitary system and 
confederal system of government. A confederal system is a ‘union of states 
whose members have not decided to create a new federal nation-state; the 
component units have retained a greater or lesser portion of their freedom of 
action while voluntarily joining the association on some common goals and 
some delegation of authority to a common machinery’.6 A federation stands 
between a unitary form of government, whereby the central authority is so 
powerful that regional authorities become subordinate, and confederation, 
in which the central power ceases to exercise independent will and thus 
becomes the servant of the local governments. 
Wheare states that the principle of organisation in a federal system is that 
the federal and the state governments are ‘co-ordinate and independent 
within their respective spheres.’7 The principle of organisation in a 
confederation is the principle of subordination of common authority or 
4 E. A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy (2nd edn), London, Macmillan and 
Co., 1893, pp.84–5.
5 William P. Maddox, ‘The Political Basis of Federation’, American Political Science Review, 1941, p.1121.
6 Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism, pp.160–1..
7 K. C. Wheare, op.cit., pp.4–5.
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general government to member states.8 In a confederation the machinery of 
the common authority, in principle, is only authorised to operate upon the 
state governments and not directly upon the population.9 Even in situations 
where the common authority is authorised to use its machinery to act 
directly upon the citizens of the member states, the authority extends only to 
minor areas and unimportant matters. Furthermore, the common authority 
does not have significant central coercive and tax-collecting powers.10 On 
the contrary, all governments within a federal system are equal. They are not 
subordinate to each other, but co-ordinate among themselves. 
HISTORICAL GLIMPSE OF FEDERALISM  
IN MALAYSIA
Before independence British indirect rule in the Malay States was exercised 
in two forms, federal and state administrations. The Federation of Protected 
Malay States, also known as the Federated Malay States (FMS),11 practised 
federal administration.12 In other Malay States, referred to as the Unfederated 
Malay Sates (UFMS),13 the existing state administration was preserved. 
The formation of the FMS was due to financial reasons,14 administrative 
simplicity,15 uniformity of policy, and enhancement of co-ordination and 
8 K. C. Wheare, op.cit., p.4.
9 K. C. Wheare, op.cit., pp.11–4.
10 I. D. Duchacek, op.cit., p.160.
11 Hereinafter the Federated Malay States shall be referred to as the FMS. It comprised Perak, Selangor, 
Pahang, and Negeri Sembilan.
12 The FMS was established by the Treaty of Federation 1895.
13 Hereinafter the Unfederated Malay States shall be referred to as the UFMS. It comprised Kedah, 
Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis and Johor.
14 Emily Sadka, The Protected Malay States, pp.364–6.
15 B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism 1945–1963: A Study of Federal Problems in a Plural Society, 
Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp.17–8.
co-operation.16 Power was concentrated in the Resident-General, who stood 
at the apex of the federal hierarchy,17 and federal secretariats,18 at the expense 
of State Governments.19 Measures later had been introduced to decentralise 
the administration of the FMS but failed. The establishment of the Rulers’ 
Conference or Durbar did not increase the power and influence of the 
Sultans because it was a purely advisory institution with no legislative or 
financial power.20 Instead it became an instrument that took away a degree 
of legislative independence from the State Councils.21 The ‘Agreement for 
the Constitution of a Federal Council, 1909’ meanwhile, only shifted the 
centralised authority from the Resident-General to the High Commissioner.22 
Furthermore the Federal Council had deprived the legislative power of State 
Council and ended the financial prerogatives of the States.23 Amidst the 
centralisation, the absence of a federal executive body caused an anomaly, 
because although in theory the executive power of the states was in the 
hands of the Ruler in Council, in practice it was exercised by the High 
Commissioner and the Resident-General.24
16 Jagjit Singh Sidhu, Administration In The Federated Malay States 1896-1920, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford 
University Press, 1980, pp.24–6.
17 Eunice Thio, British Policy In The Malay Peninsula 1880-1910, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya 
Press, 1969, pp.167–71.
18 David McIntyre, ‘Political History 1896–1946’, in Wang Gungwu ed., Malaysia: A Survey, London 
and Dunmow, Pall Mall Press, 1964, pp.138–9.
19 R. Braddell, The Legal Status, p.14.
20 R. Winstedt, Britain and Malaya, pp.39–41.
21 Laws, which were drafted by a Federal Officer and the Legal Adviser in Kuala Lumpur, were passed 
on to the Conference. The Rulers then would submit it to their State Councils so that the laws 
would be approved in identical form. S. W. Jones, Public Administration in Malaya, pp. 32–4.
22 Chai Hon Chan, The Development of British Malaya (2nd edn), Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University 
Press, 1967, pp.72–5.
23 Administration In The Federated Malay States, pp.78–81 and pp.101–2.
24 Chai Hon Chan, ibid, pp.72–7.
226   Fifty Years of Malaysia Fifty Years of Malaysia   227
After World War II, the unitary Malayan Union was abandoned due to 
claims for more rights for the Malays as the indigenous inhabitants of 
the country, and also due to the desire to maintain the sovereignty of the 
Rulers. The Federation of Malaya Treaty 1948 established the Federation 
of Malaya 1948. The 1948 Federation established autocratic colonial 
rule at federal level and autocratic local feudal rule at state level. At the 
federal level the British High Commissioner, who exercised his executive 
power with the assistance of a Federal Executive Council, headed the 
government. Legislative power was exercised by the Federal Legislative 
Council, which was dominated by unofficial members nominated by the 
High Commissioner. The Rulers at this level acted through a body called 
‘the Conference of Rulers’, which had the power to decide some important 
matters affecting the Federation as a whole. A Supreme Court, which 
consisted of a High Court and a Court of Appeal, had been constituted for 
the whole Federation. One of the notable features of the 1948 Federation 
is the restoration of the feudal structure at State level. The federal system 
is more closely associated with the rights and privileges of the Malays and 
the Rulers. The federal system during this period thus has been used to 
re-establish the feudal system, and accords privileges to the indigenous 
population. Federalism thus seems unattractive to supporters of equality 
and liberal democracy because it has been used as a method for the 
preferential treatment of the indigenous ethnic community.
The federal system that had been practised in Malaya before independence 
did not provide a good experience for the states. The Federated Malay States 
(FMS), which marked the beginning of a modern centralised administrative 
organisation in the Peninsula, turned out to be a device for British colonial 
rule to consolidate power. It also reduced the autonomy of the member 
states and made state bureaucracy subordinate to federal authority. The 
effects blurred the distinction between direct and indirect rule. Instead 
of preserving local or state independence and encouraging diversity at a 
regional level, federalism before World War II served only as a colonial tool 
for centralisation and greater intervention. 
The primary force behind the adoption of the federal system in 1957 lies 
with the role and power of the Rulers. Federalism, which underpins unity 
in diversity, appears to have provided the most appropriate system to 
accommodate the retention of the special position of the Malays and the 
sovereignty of the Rulers while geographical factors and demography only 
played subsidiary roles. The main causes of the adoption of the system in 
1957 thus are quite different from those of any other federation, while the 
reasons for the enlargement of the Federation in 1963 are quite similar to 
those of other federations. The most important reasons in 1963 were those 
of security, military and defence. Economic and administrative factors also 
became the contributing factors for the decision of new member states to 
federate. Behind the successful establishment of Malaysia in 1963 were the 
political will and power of the British and Malayan governments.
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SOME CONFUSIONS AT THE EARLY STAGE OF 
MALAYSIAN FEDERALISM
It is pertinent at this stage to understand the basic principles underlying 
the powers in the Malaysian constitutional framework. The recognition 
of the individuality, identity and power of its thirteen member states, 
as manifested by Article 1,25 Part V,26 and Part VI27 of the Constitution, 
does not mean that they have complete sovereignty. Sovereignty in the 
Federation, from the international perspective, lies not with the states but 
with the Federation. Consequential to the formation of the Federation, the 
associating states transferred their sovereignty to the new nation, which was 
the Federation of Malaysia; a view that has been accepted by the component 
members as can be observed in the memorandum submitted by the Malaysia 
Solidarity Consultative Committee.28 The power to conduct external 
relations and to represent the federation as sovereign state, are exclusive 
to the federal government. More importantly the legal status of the state 
denies the application of a principal of unanimity, which is a principle in a 
confederation. The states of a federation do not have the right of unilateral 
25 The article relates to the name and territories of the components of the Federation.
26 Part V of the Federal Constitution enumerates provisions relating to the Heads of States of the member 
states, the guarantee of the State Constitution and the privileges of the State legislative assembly.
27 Part VI of the Federal Constitution relates to the distribution of power between federal and state 
governments.
28 In the memorandum it is stated that the Federation of Malaysia is envisaged as ‘an association of 
several sovereign States with a central organ invested with powers directly over the citizens of the 
member State and in certain defined circumstances over the member States themselves. There would 
be a central government and also State Governments, but from the view-point of international law, 
the collection of States forming the Federation would be recognised as one Sovereign State within 
the family of nations.’ It is also mentioned that ‘there is no doubt in the mind of the Committee that, 
from the international point of view, sovereignty rests with the Federation of Malaysia.’ ‘Malaysia 
Solidarity Consultative Committee Memorandum On Malaysia’, in James Wong Kim Min, The Birth 
of Malaysia, p.113.
secession, and admission and expulsion of a member state does not require 
the unanimous approval of all member states. These federal principles can 
be observed in the relevant constitutional provisions as shall be discussed 
later and as expounded by the court in the case below.
IS THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA 1957 A 
FEDERATION OR A CONFEDERATION? IS 
MALAYSIA A NEW FEDERATION OR AN 
ENLARGED EXISTING FEDERATION? 
The Government of the State of Kelantan v. The Government of the 
Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj
Before Malaysia was proclaimed, a legal action was initiated to stop the 
federation from being established. The case manifested the confusion or 
uncertainty over the actual relationship between the states and the federal 
government, and the position and role of the Malay Rulers within the 
federation. 
The Government of the State of Kelantan v The Government of the Federation 
of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj29 deals with the power 
of admission of new member states into the Federation. In this case, the 
Government of the State of Kelantan attempted to prevent the formation of 
Malaysia and had sought for a declaration that the Malaysia Agreement and 
29 [1963] 1 MLJ 355.
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the Malaysia Act to establish the Federation of Malaysia, ‘were null and void 
or alternatively were not binding on the State’. It was argued, among others, 
that the proposed changes caused by the Agreement and the Act 
needed the consent of each of the constituent States, including 
Kelantan, and this had not been obtained; that the Ruler of 
Kelantan should have been a party to the Malaysia Agreement; 
that constitutional convention called for consultation with 
Rulers of individual States as to substantial changes to be made 
to the Constitution.30
The judge however was satisfied that Article 2 of the Constitution permits 
Parliament to admit other states into the Federation. The Malaysia Act had 
been passed in accordance with Article 159 which requires any amendment 
of the Constitution made in connection with the admission of any state to 
have only the support of a simple majority in both Houses of Parliament. 
The judge further held that Parliament had not acted beyond its power in 
passing the Act. 
It may be said that the view of the judge stated above is consonant with 
the general power of admission in a federal system where majoritarian 
rule applies and since Parliament is comprised of representatives of the 
whole population in the House of Representatives and Senate, the passing 
30 [1963] 1 MLJ 355, p. 357.
of the Malaysia Act, not only with simple majority but also by a two-thirds 
majority in both houses, fulfilled  such a requirement. Moreover, in the Reid 
Commission Report there is no mention of admission of new members to 
the Federation, or the requirement of consent or consultation with the state 
government or the Malay Rulers regarding the matter.
The validity of the Malaysia Agreement entered into by the Prime Minister 
and five other federal ministers on behalf of the Federation was also upheld 
in the case as being an exercise of the executive power of the federation 
under Article 39. Such power, by virtue of Article 80 (1), extends to all 
matters which the Parliament may make laws as provided under Article 74 
read together with the Ninth Schedule i.e. external affairs.31 
Nevertheless it is interesting to note that the judge in The Government of the 
State of Kelantan32 alluded to the need for states to be consulted before certain 
changes could be made to the Constitution when such is ‘so fundamentally 
revolutionary’.
In doing these things I cannot see that Parliament went in any 
way beyond its powers or that it did anything so fundamentally 
revolutionary as to require fulfilment of a condition which the 
31 Item 1 of the Federal List of 9th Schedule of the Federal Constitution states the power over external 
affairs, includes:
(a) Treaties, agreements and conventions with other countries and all matters which bring the
     Federation into relations with any other country;
(b) Implementation of treaties, agreements and conventions with other countries.
32 [1963] 1 MLJ 355.
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Constitution itself does not prescribe, that is to say a condition  
to the effect that the State of Kelantan or any other State should  
be consulted.33
Albeit, when an amendment is ‘so fundamentally revolutionary’ is not further 
explained in the case and is also not prescribed in the Constitution.
The unilateral power of admission of a new member by the federal legislature 
and executive in Malaysia may not necessarily jeopardise the rights of the 
existing states. In 1963 the admission of the new states did not jeopardise the 
rights and position of the existing members and the relationship between the 
existing or original states and the federal government remained unimpaired 
although the new members were accorded more rights and privileges. 
Although it has been stated above that the process of determining is 
democratic after being approved by Parliament and after local populations 
were consulted by the Commissions, the issue of fairness may still be argued. 
The local populations of North Borneo and Sarawak were consulted by 
the Commissions and there was a referendum in Singapore. However, the 
population of Malaya was neither consulted nor given the opportunity to 
vote in a referendum. It was not discussed as an issue in the previous general 
election held in 1959, as the idea was mooted in 1961 and materialised two 
years later. We can never know whether the population of the Federation of 
Malaya in 1963 would have agreed to the larger federation or not. 
33 [1963] 1 MLJ 355, 359.
We also do not know exactly why Kelantan opposed the admission of 
the new member States as no official statement or record was issued. 
However based on the argument made by Kelantan it appears that it was 
not acting alone but perhaps with the support of the Malay Rulers. When 
the Federation of Malaya was born on 31st August 1957, many checks had 
been made with relevant authorities, such as the traditional rulers, local 
politicians, and the local population. Unfortunately the Malay Rulers and 
the states were marginalised in the process of establishing Malaysia. Tradition 
requires that elders and leaders must be consulted and at least informed 
whenever important decisions are made and significant events are done. 
Unfortunately the Malay Rulers and the states were marginalised in the 
process of establishing Malaysia. There is no record found so far that the 
Conference of Rulers gave its consent on the matter. Individual rulers were 
also not met and consulted by the federal authorities. Perhaps this is the 
main reason why Kelantan initiated the legal action, so that all states should 
be treated as equal partners as required by ideals of federalism.
UNITARY COUNTRY OR FEDERAL COUNTRY?
Perhaps for most Malaysian citizens, especially from Peninsular Malaysia, 
the issue whether they are living in a unitary country or in a federation does 
not make any real difference. The indifference is due to the dominance of 
the same ruling party since independence at both federal and state levels. 
The ability of Barisan Nasional (previously known as the Alliance) to 
control the federal government for more than fifty years has facilitated a 
centralised federalism. This domination coincides with the increased role 
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of the federal authority in decision-making which has been legitimised 
in terms of the need to ensure Malaysia’s security and to preserve 
ethno-religious harmony in multi-ethnic, multi-religious Malaysia. The 
abolition of local authority elections in the 1970s has allowed the federal 
government to further penetrate into the third tier of government where 
their appointed councillors dominate the municipalities, town councils 
and district councils. Thus it does not really make much difference where 
a citizen lives, except perhaps if in opposition-controlled states, because 
members of the state governments act as if they are federal administrators. 
In reality it is hard to distinguish between unitary government and 
Malaysian federalism Alliance/BN style.
The sovereignty or autonomy of the state in exercising power over matters 
assigned to it is very crucial in federalism. However in Malaysia state 
autonomy appears not to be a very serious or important issue except in 
opposition-controlled states. Perhaps most people are more concerned 
about the plight of their states’ football teams in Piala Malaysia.34 The 
insensitivity relates to the fact that most ordinary citizens do not have a good 
understanding of the system. Based on a recent survey conducted almost half 
of the people interviewed have only medium knowledge or understanding 
on the federal system of government in Malaysia. About 11 per cent of the 
34 Ironically Singapore also took part in this tournament and had successfully denied Malaysian states 
from winning the trophy many times until 1994 when the team withdrew from the tournament. 
population do not really know about the system and only 40 per cent have 






n  per cent n  per cent
102 10.6 473 49.3 385 40.1
THE UBIQUITOUS COERCIVE MEANS AND LEGAL 
POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
i) Principle of equality in federalism
The principle of equality in a federal system requires all governments within 
a federal system be of equal status. Since the two levels of government are 
equal ‘sovereigns’, neither federal nor state governments are subordinate to 
each other. As pointed out in the Kilbrandon Report:
In a federal system sovereignty is divided between two levels 
of government. The federal government is sovereign in some 
35 ‘The Level of Acceptance on the Concept of Federalism and Its Application in Malaysia’, Researchers: 
Assoc Prof Dr Faridah Jalil, Dr Nazri Muslim, Assoc Prof Dr Khairil Azmin Mokhtar, Mrs Norhafilah 
Musa and Mrs Rasyikah Md Khalid. Presented at The Roundtable Discussion to Commemorate 
50 Years of Malaysian Federation (Series I), 25 September 2013 (Wednesday) at Danau Golf Club, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
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matters and the provincial governments are sovereign in others. 
Each within its own sphere exercises its power without control 
from the other, and neither is subordinate to the other.36
Consequential to the principle of equality in a federal system is that each level 
of government possesses exclusive power in matters which come under their 
own jurisdictions. Based on the division of power established by a federal 
constitution, each government has the right and should possess the ability 
to establish a legislative body to make law, an executive organ to formulate 
policy, and the judiciary to decide disputes that fall within its jurisdiction. 
They also should be able to have administrative bodies to implement their 
own policies and laws.37 These rights and abilities are essential to maintain 
the notion of ‘co-ordinate and independent’ governments and to maintain 
the notion of the equal status of federal and state governments. 
The principle of equality also precipitates the rejection of the use of any kind 
of threat and coercion by one government to another because that affects the 
independence of the other government. 
ii) Power and process relating to admission, expulsion and 
secession of member states
It is crucial that the power of secession and expulsion of member states is 
not put in a position whereby it can be abused by either federal or state. 
36 Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969–1973. Report. vol.1, Cmnd. 5460, London. HMSO, 1973, p.502.
37 M. Forsyth, Unions of States, pp.13–4 and K. C. Wheare, op.cit., p.4.
In Malaysia where power to secede and expel a member state has been 
exercised, and the power of admission has also been used, it is felt that such 
matters should come under closer scrutiny. 
The worst threat and coercion that can be made by a federal government is 
expulsion of a member state from the federation, and the worst threat that can be 
made by a state government is secession. Therefore Wheare holds the view that 
the ‘unilateral right to secede or to expel makes for bad federal government’.38 
Thus it is believed that both rights are inconsistent with the principle of 
equality and should not be recognised in a federal system. Admission of 
a new member to a federation could weaken the position of the existing 
member states due to a larger number of states in the federation. However 
unlike the consequence of secession and expulsion the effect of the admission 
does not cause the federation to disintegrate. Thus it is viewed that unlike the 
unilateral right to secede by the state or to expel by the federal government, 
the use of unilateral power of admission by the federal government does not 
constitute an extremely serious threat to the state. 
iii) Admission of new member state 
Power to admit a new member is exercised by the federal legislature by 
passing a federal law, obviously a law that includes an amendment of 
the Federal Constitution.39 The constitutional provision that needs to 
38 K. C. Wheare, op.cit., pp.86–7.
39 Article 2 (a) states ‘Parliament may by law admit other States to the Federation’.
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be amended is Article 1(2), which enumerates the States comprising the 
Federation. Basically, the admission requires only the support of a simple 
majority of the members voting in both houses of Parliament in order to 
amend the constitution.40 The power has been used once so far — when 
Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore joined the existing members of the Federation 
of Malaya 1957 to form the Federation of Malaysia in 1963.
The admission of these states was done by means of the passing of the 
Malaysia Act, which provides, inter alia, for the admission of the three new 
states41 and for the renaming of the federation42. Prior to the passing of the 
Malaysia Act, the Malaysia Agreement was signed after the Federation of 
Malaya, the three states, and Britain had agreed to the idea of forming the 
Federation of Malaysia. In the process of forming Malaysia neither state 
governments nor the Malay Rulers were involved or consulted which caused 
dissatisfaction. It is felt that if the power of the federal government to admit 
new members may cause any form of subordination of the existing states to 
the federal government or can be used by the federal government against 
state government as a form of coercion and threat, then the power should 
not be vested in the federal government alone. If admission of new members 
40 Since (4) of Article 150 states that an ‘amendment made for or in connection with the admission of 
any State to the Federation or its association with the States thereof’ does not come under clause (3) 
of Article 159, which requires the support of a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament, 
amendment of Article 1 (2) in order to include new members comes under the amendment 
procedure for the fourth category of constitutional provisions that have been discussed earlier.
41 Article 1(2)
42 Article 1(1) of the Federal Constitution. This provision has been amended to change the name of 
the 1957 Federation which is known as ‘Persekutuan Tanah Melayu (in English the Federation of 
Malaya)’ to Malaysia.
will alter the political and economic position of the existing states to their 
disadvantage, the states should be able to have some power in the process. 
iv) Secession of member state
There is no constitutional provision dealing with secession in the Malaysian 
Constitution. There is also no mention about the matter in the Reid Report 
and the IGCC. However, in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
of North Borneo and Sarawak (the Cobbold Commission), there were 
some suggestions made by several witnesses to provide a trial period for 
the prospective members, with a right to secede from the Federation. 
The Commission however did not recommend the inclusion of such a 
clause, because it was felt that the decision to create a federation should be 
made wholeheartedly and without reservation. The Commission was also 
concerned that such an inclusion ‘would mean a continuation throughout 
the trial period of political and perhaps racial division.’43 
It is considered that the absence of a clause for secession does not conflict 
with the principle of federalism.44 Whether it should be included in 
the constitution or not depends on political expediency. The parties to 
43 The Report of the Commission of Enquiry of North Borneo and Sarawak, in James Wong Kim Min, 
The Birth of Malaysia, pp.60–1. It seems that the concern of the Commission was based on the social 
and economic realities during the time and its decision is not unfounded. Even today, the processes 
of racial and territorial integration, and nation building are still going on and beset with difficulties. 
The importance of the matter and the magnitude of the problem are manifested by the existence of a 
ministry that deals specifically with such matters.
44 On the contrary, it has been argued that the absence of such a clause can be the reason for the 
complete disintegration of a federation. J. H Proctor Junior, ‘Constitutional Defects and the Collapse 
of the West Indian Federation’, Public Law, 1964, p.125.
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the Malaya and Malaysia Agreements decided that there should be no 
turning back after forming the federation. Furthermore, the Federation of 
Malaya, which later become the Federation of Malaysia, was intended to 
be a federation with a strong federal government.45 Accordingly, it was felt 
that at the time there was no need for a clause for secession. This view is in 
consonance with the general acceptance of the idea of forming a federation. 
Such a clause is also absent in other federations such as India, Australia and 
the United States of America. It is thought therefore that a federation, as a 
nation, must be an indestructible union. 
In the absence of the express provision of a right of unilateral secession by a 
member state, such power is accordingly denied to the state. This view is in 
conformity with federalism, and in line with the legal status of the member 
state. The states of the Federation of Malaysia are not fully sovereign nations. 
They are not sovereign from the international law perspective, and thus do 
not have the right to secede or break away from the federation thus formed. 
Not being subjects of international law, the constituent units of a federation 
do not have the same rights as members of a confederation. Thus in Malaysia, 
where there is no unilateral right of secession by the states, the constitutional 
position relating to secession is in conformity with the federal principle. 
45 This notion can be observed in the terms of reference for the Reid Commission in drafting the 
Federation of Malaya Constitution 1957, and the terms of reference mentioned in the Malaysia 
Solidarity Consultative Committee Memorandum on Malaysia, which later became the guide for 
the Inter-Governmental Committee in drafting a detailed proposal of constitutional arrangements 
consequential to the admission of Sabah and Sarawak into Malaysia.
Any act or movement to secede unilaterally can be regarded as treason. Any 
such attempt can be interpreted as an attempt to break the federation and 
may come under the ambit of Article 150(1),46 which gives the reasons for 
the declaration of an emergency by the King. Circumstances which give 
rise to a situation which can disintegrate the federation seem to be one of 
the valid and legal reasons to declare an emergency, because Article 150 (1) 
states ‘a grave emergency exists whereby the security, or the economic life, 
or public order in the Federation or any part thereof is threatened.’ It seems 
justifiable for the Malaysian government to make use of drastic law and 
military power to deal with unilateral secession because any such act and 
movement can be regarded as rebellion against the Federation. Separation 
seems, as in the case of Singapore in 1965, only possible when it is initiated 
by the federal government.
In addition before the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allowed the federal 
executive to detain a person without trial, was repealed, the federal executive 
deemed it necessary to make use of the power of detention without trial 
in order to stop any person ‘from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 
security of Malaysia’. It is believed that detention based on such an act 
relating to secession has been invoked several times.47 
46 Article 150 (1) states ‘If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby 
the security, or the economic life, or public order in the Federation or any part thereof is threatened, 
he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency making therein a declaration to that effect.’
47 The reason for detention under ISA is not made public, therefore it is not possible for the writer 
to determine the exact cause for detention. However it is believed that the detention of Datuk Dr 
Jeffrey G Kitingan, who is the brother of the former Chief Minister of Sabah and also head of PBS 
which is the opposition party at the federal level, was in connection with an alleged attempt to 
secede Sabah from Malaysia.
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v) Expulsion of a member state
There is no provision which specifically deals with expulsion in the 
Malaysian Constitution. There is also no mention about it in the Reid Report, 
IGCC and the Cobbold Report. Despite the absence of express constitutional 
provision, a state was ‘expelled’ or separated from the Federation in 1965. 
Under the present constitutional arrangement, the power to expel a 
state lies with the federal government. It can be affected by a federal law, 
which amends the Constitution to exclude the state from being part of 
the Federation, and is passed by Parliament. The legal or constitutional 
power and process to expel a state from the Federation under the Malaysian 
federal arrangement is similar to the power and process of admitting a new 
member state. Amendment to the Constitution in order to affect expulsion 
need not be supported by a special majority, it is sufficient for it to receive 
the support of a simple majority of both houses. The support of two-thirds 
majority in both houses is required only if the amendment relates to Sabah 
or Sarawak.48 The requirement for a special majority provides a certain 
degree of safeguards and puts the two states in a better position compared 
to other states.
48 Obviously there are two different procedural requirements to pass an amending Act in order to 
expel a member state. The first procedure applies to all states except Sabah and Sarawak, while the 
second procedure applies only to Sabah and Sarawak. The first procedure requires an amending 
law to be supported only by a simple majority of both houses of Parliament. In order to affect the 
separation, the Parliament has to amend Article 1(2) to exclude or delete the state concerned from 
the provision. The amendment of Article 1(2) has to observe Article 159 (4) (bb), which requires 
the amending bill to be supported by simple majority. The second procedure, which only applies to 
Sabah and Sarawak, requires the amending bill to be supported by at least a two-thirds majority in 
both houses of Parliament. The requirement for a two-thirds majority is in pursuant to Article 161E 
(1), which excluded Sabah and Sarawak from the application of Article 159 (4) (bb). 
The secession or expulsion of Singapore in 1965 illustrates the power and 
process of the expulsion of a state in Malaysia. Singapore, which became 
a member of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, ceased to be a member 
of the Federation in 1965. The separation was affected by the amendment 
of the Malaysian Constitution consequent to the passing of the Malaysia 
(Singapore Amendment) Act 1965. The amendment Act was preceded by 
the Separation of Singapore Agreement, 1965 which was entered into by 
the Federal Government and the State Government of Singapore. After the 
amendment in 1965, further amendments consequential to the separation 
were effected in 1966 by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1966. 
It is considered that the power to expel a member state can be exercised 
unilaterally by the federal government. However, according to Shafruddin, 
the agreement that took place between the Federal and State Government 
of Singapore before the amending Act for the separation was passed, 
suggests that, ‘separation or secession must be effected through Centre-
State agreement rather than by unilateral action’.49 Shafruddin’s suggestion 
is probably right if the requirement for bilateral agreement prior to the 
passing of the amending Act is based on political expediency and necessity. 
However such requirement has no legal basis. From a legal point of view, 
it is submitted that the Federal Government is not bound to consult the 
state prior to the expulsion. Consequently there is no legal obligation for 
the Federal Government to enter into agreement with the state government 
concerned prior to its expulsion. 
49 B. H. Shafruddin, The Federal Factor, p.26.
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It is believed the power to expel a member state should not be treated in a 
similar manner to the power of admitting a new member. Unilateral power 
of expulsion by a federal government is inconsistent with federalism. It is not 
in accordance with the principle of equality of status because it will cause 
the subordination of state government to federal government. In accordance 
with the principles of equality and the prevention of the subordination of 
one level of government to the other, the power of expulsion or separation 
of a member state from the federation must not be vested in one government 
only. If such power is vested solely in the federal government, who may 
exercise it unilaterally, it can be used as a means of threat and coercion which 
will cause the subordination of state government. The power of expulsion 
or separation must be exercised mutually between the federal government 
and the member state concerned. Only in this manner does the power of 
expulsion not jeopardise the equal status between the two governments 
and safeguard the rights and interests of state government. Accordingly, the 
constitutional position relating to expulsion in Malaysia is inconsistent with 
federalism.
vi) Constitutional power to amend the federal constitution
The power to amend the supreme written federal constitution is of enormous 
significance, because the document embodies the division of power between 
the federation and the states and the safeguards of both levels of governments. 
As equal partners, the state and the federal government must have the right 
to have some say in the process of amending the constitution. Thus there 
should be a mechanism in which both levels of government are involved in 
the process of amending the constitution. Usually the involvement of the 
state in amendment process is achieved by having a bicameral legislature, 
whereby states are represented in the upper house of federal legislature, 
which has been generally referred to as the Senate.
Constitutional recognition of the legal power to amend the constitution 
means that federal terms in the constitution are susceptible to changes. 
In such a situation, where constitutional provisions relating to the federal 
relationship can be altered, it is important not only to determine to what 
extent it can be changed, but more importantly who has the power and how 
the power should be exercised. These matters determine to what extent 
the principle of equality, and the notion of independent and co-ordinate 
governments apply in the Malaysian federal system 
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia is the supreme law, but it is no 
unalterable sacred divine document.50 The courts have rejected the idea that 
the Constitution cannot be changed, as well as arguments that deny that 
the power of formal amendment is vested in the Parliament51. The need for 
reconciliation between permanency and flexibility however has resulted in 
some constitutional entrenchments that render some parts of the Federal 
Constitution more difficult to amend than ordinary law. The entrenchments 
50 When drafting proposals for the Independence Constitution in 1957, the Reid Commission mentions 
in its proposal that ’it is important that the method of amending the Constitution should be neither 
so difficult as to produce frustration nor so easy as to seriously weaken the safeguards which the 
Constitution provides’. Report of The Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, p.31.
51 Loh Kooi Coon v. Government of Malaysia [1977] 187.
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are prescribed by Articles 159 and 161E of the Constitution, which dealwith 
the formal amending power of the Constitution. Unlike Article 159, which is 
of general application, Article 161E only applies to the States of Sabah and 
Sarawak. The power of formal amendment of the Malaysian Constitution, 
which is vested in the Parliament, can be exercised at any time. 
The power of amending the Constitution is vested in the Parliament.52 
Amendment to the Constitution is made by the passing of an amending 
law, which is a federal law, in accordance with the requirements prescribed 
by Article 159, which should be read together with Article 161E. The 
procedure to amend the Constitution under the Articles is not uniform; 
there are four different procedural requirements. Each procedure applies to 
certain provisions of the Constitution. Hence provisions of the Malaysian 
Constitution can be classified into four categories according to the procedural 
requirement for their amendment. The categorisation of constitutional 
provisions, which is made below, shows some of the provisions are more 
important than others, and preferential treatment for some states. More 
importantly the discussion below enables us to determine whether the 
method of amendment of the Malaysian Constitution is consonant with the 
principles of federalism. 
The first category is constitutional provisions that can only be amended 
by an Act that has been supported by at least a two-thirds majority in both 
52 The Parliament comprised of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the King.
Houses of Parliament on the second and third readings as stated in Article 
159 (3). This procedure is the general procedure of amendment because it 
applies to any provision of the Constitution unless otherwise stated. The 
provisions that come under this category include those relating to essential 
aspects of democracy and federalism, such as the doctrine of separation of 
power, judicial review, judicial independence, election and distribution of 
power between federal and state.
The second category is provisions that can only be amended through an 
Act that commands the support of a two-thirds majority in each House of 
Parliament on the second and third readings, and has later received consent 
from the Conference of Rulers.53 The constitutional provisions in perspective 
are those relating to citizenship,54 the Conference of Rulers,55 the precedence 
of Rulers and Governors,56 the federal guarantee of Rulers,57 the special 
position of the National Language,58 and ‘the special position and privileges 
of Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of 
other communities’.59 The category also includes a constitutional provision 
which limits the freedom of expression as mentioned under Article 10(4) 
and any law made under it, and Articles 63(4) and 72(4). 
53 Article 159 (5). The Article provides ‘a law making an amendment to Clause (4) of Article 10, any 
law passed thereunder, the provisions of Part III, Article 38, 63 (4), 70, 71 (1), 72 (4), 152 or 153  
or to this Clause shall not be passed without the consent of the Conference of Rulers.’
54 Part III of the Federal Constitution.
55 Article 38 of the Federal Constitution.
56 Article 70 of the Federal Constitution.
57 Article 71(1) of the Federal Constitution.
58 Article 152 of the Federal Constitution.
59 Article 153 of the Federal Constitution.
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The third category covers provisions that can only be amended by an Act 
supported by a two-thirds majority in each House of Parliament on the 
second and third readings, together with the concurrence of the Governor 
of the East Malaysian States concerned. The amendment procedure for the 
provisions, which is stated in Article 161E, only applies to the states of Sabah 
and Sarawak regarding certain matters. The concurrence of the Governors of 
both states, effectively the government of the respective states, is required if 
the amendment affects both East Malaysian States, if the amendment affects 
only one of the States, then only the consent of the Governor of that state is 
required. This category covers provisions that relate to matters enumerated 
in Article 161E, which generally concerns the special position and privileges 
of the two East Malaysian States.
The fourth and final category is provisions that can be amended by a 
Bill supported by a simple majority in the House of Representatives and 
the senate. Simple majority here means a majority of members present 
and voting, similar to that required by ordinary legislative process. The 
constitutional provisions that come under this category are those which 
are not covered by any of the above procedures.60 The matters include ‘any 
amendment made for, or in connection with, the admission of any state to 
the Federation or its association with the states thereof, or any modification 
made as to the application of this Constitution to a state previously so 
admitted or associated’.61 
60 Article 159 (4).
61 Article 159 (bb) of the Federal Constitution.
In addition to the special requirements stated in Articles 159 and 161E, it 
is submitted that law passed to amend the Constitution is also subject to 
general legislative procedure as stated in Article 66. Since any constitutional 
amendment takes the form of federal laws, the mode of exercise of legislative 
power by Parliament applies. Accordingly assent of the King is required 
before any amendment bill, which has gone though the requirements of 
Article 159 or 161E, becomes a law. However, in this regard the assent is 
just a formality. The reason for this is by virtue of an amendment of the 
constitutional provision in 1984, that the assent will be ‘deemed to be 
given’ thirty days after it has been presented to the King for his assent. If an 
amending Bill is not assented by the King, it shall become law ‘in the like 
manner as if he had assented to it’, thirty days after it was presented to him.62 
Based on several decided cases, it appears to be no substantive limitation on 
the formal power of amendment exercised by the Parliament. The decision 
of the courts in Loh Kooi Choon v Govt Of Malaysia63 and Phang Chin Hock 
v PP64 shows that there is no provision in the Constitution that cannot 
be amended by parliament. In these cases the courts have been urged to 
adopt the doctrine of implied limitation or the doctrine of basic structure 
of constitution, which has been followed by Indian courts.65 If the doctrine 
is followed then there are some features of the Constitution that cannot be 
changed, which include the federal structure of the government. However, 
62 Articles 66(4) and (4A) of the Federal Constitution..
63 [1977] 2 MLJ 187.
64 [1980] 1 MLJ 70.
65 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] SCR Supp. 1; AIR 1973 SC 1461.
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the Federal Court of Malaysia has refused to adopt the doctrine. Thus there 
is no limitation of the power of the Parliament to amend the Malaysian 
Constitution. As long as the power is exercised by the federal legislature in 
compliance with the relevant procedural requirements, the amendment is 
then valid and constitutional. Federalism would be real.  
Several aspects relating to federalism can be deduced from the four 
categories and the procedure above. Firstly, relating to the role of the state 
in the process of amendment: the state does not become involved in the 
amending process at all. This applies to the legislature and executive bodies 
of all states, except Sabah and Sarawak, in all matters. These two states 
have constitutional rights to veto any amendment which comes within the 
ambit stipulated under Article 161E, that is prejudicial to their interest, 
because under Article 161E assent of the Governor of the states is required. 
It is submitted that the Governor has no discretion regarding his assent to 
such a Bill, and he has to exercise it in accordance with advice tendered by 
the state government.66 It can be concluded firstly that the states of Sabah 
and Sarawak have more rights, safeguards and power than the rest of the 
member states in the Federation. These two states are more equal than other 
members of the Federation. The discriminatory aspect affects the principle 
of equal status of member states in a federation. Although the arrangement 
66 The requirement of the Governor to act as constitutional monarch in this respect stems from the 
argument that he has to exercise his power and function in accordance with advice except in matters 
stated in clauses (a) and (b) of s. 1 (2) of the 8th schedule to the Federal Constitution. These 
discretionary provisions do not cover his assent to a Bill passed under 161E.
was felt as practically and politically necessary and expedient, it negates the 
principle of equality, which forms part of federal principles. 
Secondly, the absence of direct involvement of the state might be prejudicial 
to their rights and interests. The defect of the parliamentary system and the 
dominance of the federal government in the senate, which shall be discussed 
later, makes the state helpless to protect their rights in the Parliament. The 
power to amend the constitution generally rests with the Parliament, which 
can easily succumb to the control of the executive or ruling authority at the 
federal level. In this regard it is believed that the amending procedure which 
does not involve the state, even in matters affecting their rights, interest and 
autonomy, with the exceptions of Sabah and Sarawak, is prejudicial to the 
notion of independent and co-ordinate government. This position also puts 
the state at the mercy of the federal government, which is contrary to the 
principle of equality between federal and state.
Thirdly, there is no special procedure dealing with the amendment of 
federal terms or constitutional provisions, which relates to the relationship 
between federal and state, except for Sabah and Sarawak. Special procedure 
is required to amend provisions affecting the rights and position of the Malay 
Rulers, and the rights of Sabah and Sarawak. However there is no special 
procedure for the amendment of the federal terms of the Constitution, or 
provisions affecting the autonomy, rights and interest of most member states. 
The federal terms incorporated in the Federal Constitution, agreed between 
the contracting parties or the associating states, can be changed unilaterally 
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by the Parliament, which can be dominated by the federal government. Due 
to this reason, and reasons mentioned in the above paragraph, the balance of 
power is tilted towards the Federal Government and renders the safeguards 
for the states ineffective.
It can be said that there are four different levels of difficulty in amending 
the Federal Constitution. The level of difficulty correlates to the safeguards 
of the provision. A better safeguard is afforded by provisions that are more 
difficult to amend. The constitutional provisions of the last category, which 
can be amended by a Bill supported by a simple majority of members 
present in both houses, seems to afford no protection at all. By comparison, 
the provisions of the first category, where a special majority of two-thirds is 
required in both houses to support the Bill, has better safeguards. The second 
and third categories, which require the assent of the Conference of Rulers 
or the Governors of the two East Malaysian states, are the most difficult to 
amend. Apart from the need to be supported by two-thirds majority, there 
are additional requirements that involve the assent of ‘outside’ institutions 
or institutions that do not form part of Parliament. It is regarded as the 
most difficult procedure because the parties whose rights are affected by 
the proposed amendment have the right to veto the Bill. Accordingly these 
provisions are the most safeguarded.
If the level of difficulty is consequential to the level of importance of the 
provisions, it may lead to an absurd legal position. Firstly it would mean 
that the rights of the states of Sabah and Sarawak are more important than 
the rights of other members of the Federation. This has to be admitted based 
on what was agreed in the Malaysia Agreement. Secondly, the fundamental 
concept of democracy and federalism is less important than the special 
position of the Malay Rulers. Thirdly, the power to expel a member state 
from the Federation is the least important. Clearly the second and third 
propositions are unacceptable and in conflict with principles of equality 
and democracy.
From a first glimpse of the foregoing observation, it might be stated that the 
existence of the states and the division of power between the federation and 
the states can be amended by Parliament through a Bill supported by at least 
a two-thirds majority in both houses. However, it is submitted that this is not 
accurate because of several reasons. Firstly, the abolition of a state requires 
the application of Article 2 (b). The Article states that ‘Parliament may by 
law alter the boundaries of any State, but a law altering the boundaries of a 
State shall not be passed without the consent of that State (expressed by a 
law made by the Legislature of that State) and of the Conference of Rulers.’ 
It is viewed that the abolition of the federal system has the effect of altering 
the boundaries of a state, even if there are subordinate regional authorities 
replacing the state government. In a unitary system, it can be generally said 
that the alteration of a boundary rests with the central authority alone. 
Secondly, abolition of the federal system means there shall be no Head of 
State for the states. Any amendment that shall end the federal system in 
Malaysia has tremendous effect on the position and power of the Malay 
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Rulers. On this basis, the federal system of government can only be changed 
with the consent of the Conference of Rulers, which means the special 
procedure of amendment for matters affecting the Rulers must apply.
From the above observation it can be concluded that the procedural 
requirement for amendment of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia 
does not fully adhere to the principle of equality. It does not provide 
adequate safeguards to protect the rights of the states, and may lead to the 
subordination of states to the federation
vii)  Emergency powers
In its recommendations the Reid Committee expressed its belief that ‘neither 
the existence of fundamental rights nor the division of powers between the 
Federation and the states ought to be permitted to imperil the safety of the 
State or the preservation of a democratic way of life’.67 Accordingly, upon the 
proclamation of emergency by the King under Article 150, the Parliament 
not only has the authority to pass law which can be inconsistent with the 
Constitution and restrict fundamental liberties, it may also exercise the 
legislative and executive power of the states. Surely this power is only meant 
for extreme or grave situations and for a temporary period: It can hardly 
be imagined that the legal order and power established by virtue of the 
proclamation is meant for normal circumstances and for an indefinite period. 
67 Report of The Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, p.74.
Unfortunately the state of emergency is not something that is ‘abnormal’ in 
Malaysia. The country gained independence during a state of emergency.68 
Since independence, emergency has been proclaimed for the whole 
federation twice,69 and once each for the states of Sarawak70 and Kelantan.71 
Accordingly, as rightly asserted by Harding:
Malaysia has been under emergency law for most of its 
existence…and legal ‘normality’ has applied only for a brief 
period. Thus ‘normality’ has to be redefined; what has become 
normal is the existence of emergency laws in parallel with the 
operation of the ordinary constitutional legal system.72
If the proclamation is declared throughout the Federation, the whole country 
can then be administered as a unitary state and the entire constitutional 
order is virtually suspended during the period. When only certain parts of 
the Federation have been declared as being in the state of emergency, the 
situation applies to that state. Therefore if an emergency is declared only 
in a state, the federal government then may exercise direct control of that 
state or assume the power of state government. Parliament thus performs 
68 Andrew Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Law 
Journal Sdn. Bhd., 1996, p.153.
69 The first proclamation after independence was made in 1964 to meet armed aggression by 
Indonesia due to its objection to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. The second 
proclamation was made on 15 May 1969 due to racial riots consequent to the general election which 
had been conducted a few days earlier.
70 The proclamation, which was made on the grounds of a threat to the security of Sarawak, had been 
made in 1966.
71 The proclamation, which was made on the grounds that the security or economic life of Kelantan 
was threatened, had been made in 1977.
72 Andrew Harding, ibid, p.159. 
256   Fifty Years of Malaysia Fifty Years of Malaysia   257
the function and power of the legislative assembly of that state, and the 
federal executive governs the state. The Parliament is not only entitled to 
pass ordinary law, but also has the authority to amend the constitution of the 
state.73 The federal government can exercise the power that under normal 
condition belongs to the state, except in religious and customary matters.74 
The enormous power assumed by the federal government during emergency 
renders the doctrine of constitutional supremacy and the distribution of 
powers unreal. This is one of the reasons why K.C. Wheare felt that the 
Federation was to be more of a ‘quasi federation’ rather than a truly federal 
system.75
The proclamation of emergency and emergency powers does not involve 
the state government at all. In fact even the validity of the proclamation 
and emergency ordinance promulgated by the King are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court.76 Once Emergency been proclaimed, the state is 
helpless in protecting their rights, as happened during the emergency in 
the state of Sarawak in 1966, and in Kelantan in 1977. On both occasions 
the federal government made the proclamation despite the absence of any 
73 Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Govt. of Malaysia [1968] 1 MLJ 119 and Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Govt. of 
Malaysia [1968] 2 MLJ p.238.
74 In addition to the absence of a procedural requirement to amend the Constitution, which has been 
discussed earlier, overwhelming substantive power is granted to the Parliament and the King to pass 
law inconsistent with the Constitution. The ability of Parliament to pass any law regardless of its 
inconsistency with the constitution is derived from clauses (5) and (6) of Article 150. The power 
of Parliament to amend any provision of the Constitution is limited only in matters mentioned in 
clause (6A) of the Art.
75 K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, p.29.
76 Article 150(8).
threat of security as contended by several scholars.77 It is asserted that 
the proclamations are politically motivated, related to tensions between 
Federal and State Governments, and not due to elements which would 
normally be expected in an emergency situation.78 In both states the Federal 
Government managed to topple the state governments, which are not 
favoured by the ruling party at the federal level, and caused the installation 
of new governments that were acceptable or pro-federal government. If the 
allegation that the power had been used by the federal government to topple 
state leadership and change the ruling party at the state level is true, than 
emergency power, which has been created to preserve democracy, can and 
has been used against federalism and democracy. 
‘Direct-intervention’ or direct rule by federal government through a 
declaration of a state of emergency clearly militates against the idea of 
federalism. If it is used by the federation against the state, the use of power 
manifests the ‘intolerance’ of the ruling party at the federal level, which 
is contrary to the idea of co-ordinate and independent government in 
77 Andrew Harding, op.cit., pp.161–3.
78 The proclamation of emergency in Sarawak in September 1966 was due to the failure of the federal 
authorities to secure the dismissal of the Chief Minister who had irritated federal leaders. As a result 
of the proclamation the Parliament amended federal and state constitutions in order to summon 
a meeting of the Council Negri without the advice of the Chief Minister. Consequently the Chief 
Minister was dismissed from office by a vote of no confidence. Kelantan meanwhile was under the 
control of a different party from the dominant party at the federal level. The ruling party at the state 
level, which is PAS, initially was an opposition party but during this period had joined the ruling 
coalition at the federal level. The main opposition of PAS in the state was UMNO, which was the 
dominant member in the coalition. Although both parties were members of the coalition it seemed 
the relationship between the parties in the state was much worse than at the federal level. The use 
of emergency power resulted entirely from tension between the federal and state governments or 
between PAS-dominated state and UMNO-backed party and leaders.
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federalism. Nevertheless it must be mentioned that the method of direct 
rule through emergency has not been used casually. The power seemed to be 
used as the last resort by the Federal Government after failing to make the 
recalcitrant state government succumb to federal control through political 
means, indirect approach, and ordinary legal powers.79 Although emergency 
powers seem to be the last resort for the ruling party at the federal level to 
assert control over the state governments, there is no justification for the 
federal government to use emergency provisions, and any power arising from 
such proclamation, to resolve political problems and tensions due to their 
differences with state governments.
It is quite unfortunate that undemocratic and arbitrary power under the 
emergency provision, which is meant to safeguard the life, freedom and 
existence of the Federation, can be easily used and invoked for political 
purposes by the Federal Government. More unfortunate is that the 
proclamation and power are beyond the control and review of the court. 
Under the existing constitutional order, the state is helpless against federal 
intrusion during the state of emergency. Emergency power may also cause 
more damaging and lasting effects to the rights and autonomy of the state 
if amendment powers exercised by the federal executive and legislature are 
made to the detriment of the state. 
79 For instance, despite several bombings in the state of Sabah, which occurred after an opposition 
party came into power in 1980s, the Federal Government did not proclaim emergency in the state. 
This is due to the fact that the opposition party managed to be toppled when elected members of 
the state legislative assemblies, amidst allegation of receiving considerable sums of money, joined 
pro-Federal Government’s party.
THE WAY FORWARD: COURTEOUS, COMPLIANCE, 
CONSENSUS AND COMPROMISE
i) Nature of Malaysian society — social contract, bargain and 
negotiation 
The essence of federal government is the surrender of sovereignty by 
associating political units to a central entity. The Federal Constitution, 
as mentioned by Chief Justice Thomson, is also ‘an Agreement between 
the previously sovereign States’ of Malaysia.80 The Federation of Malaya 
Agreement 1957 and later the Malaysia Agreement 1963 are foundational 
agreements that created the Malaysian Federation.
The Independence Constitution marks not only the transition of power 
from colonial rule to rule by the people, in line with democratic principles. 
It also marks the transfer of the right to govern from the Malay Rulers, who 
had absolute power, to the people. The people rule and the Rulers reign. As 
constitutional rulers, the Malay Rulers no longer have absolute power but 
have a few important discretionary powers to ensure the just operation of a 
democratic government.
The Federal Constitution is also an agreement between the different racial 
and religious communities in the country. The Alliance coalition of political 
80 The Government of The State of Kelantan V The Government of The Federation of Malaya and Tunku 
Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj [1963] 1 MLJ 355.
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parties representing the three major races — Malay (UMNO), Chinese 
(MCA) and Indian (MIC) made its compromise proposals: citizenship 
for non-Malays and special privileges; special status of Islam and practice 
of other religions; monarchy and democracy; federal and states’ rights; 
Malay as the national language and communal status of other languages. 
These compromises, which are embodied in the supreme constitution, is 
the constitutional basis that allowed the multi-racial and multi-cultural 
communities to live together as a nation. The spirit of give and take, as 
opposed to the winner takes all, underpins the idea of consensual democracy 
in Malaysia. The need for unity and diversity among different races is 
reflected not only in the governing coalition party (Barisan Nasional/National 
Front or formerly known as the Alliance), it also visible in the coalition of 
opposition parties (Pakatan Rakyat) which comprises several main parties 
such as PAS (Malay), DAP (Chinese) and PKR (liberal and multiracial).
It should be noted that the diversified ethnic communities, with the 
exception of the natives of East Malaysia, are not territorially grouped and 
traverse throughout the Federation. A similar pattern of demography at the 
national level exists within the states with the exceptions of Sabah, Sarawak, 
Terengganu and Kelantan.81 In this respect federalism does not appear to 
81 In the East Malaysian States of Sabah and Sarawak, the natives of the states form the dominant 
majority but there are sizeable and influential minorities. In Sarawak, the predominant ethnic group 
in Census 2000 was the Ibans which accounted for 30.1 per cent of the state’s total Malaysian 
citizens followed by the Chinese 26.7 per cent and Malays 23.0 per cent. In Sabah the predominant 
ethnic group is the Kadazan Dusun 18.4 per cent followed by Bajau 17.3 per cent and Malays  
15.3 per cent. In Terengganu and Kelantan, which are situated at the east coast of the Peninsula, 
the Malays constitute the dominant majority while other ethnic groups are insignificant minorities. 
Other ethnic groups constitute less than 10 per cent of the population of the states.
be a solution for the racial differences or problems of the Malaysian society 
because ‘federalism becomes nothing if it is held to embrace diversities that 
are not territorially grouped’.82 In practice the solution of the racial ‘problem’ 
lies with consocationalism.
‘Consociationalism’ according to Arend Lijphart may be understood as a 
‘government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented 
political culture into a stable democracy.’ The aim of consociationalism is 
to prevent cleavages from leading to explosive conflicts and disintegration, 
whereby all significant decisions require agreement and consensus among 
the leaders of the different sub-groups or ethnic groups. Unlike the federal 
system, the consociational system is dependent upon concurrent majorities 
which may not necessarily be territorially grouped. Daniel J. Elazar 
writes that, unlike federalism which ‘involves both structure and process 
of government’, ‘consociationalism involves the processes only.’ Since 
consociationalism is not fixed by constitution or law, and not subject to 
institutions established by legal means, it can be regarded as more flexible 
than federalism. Consociationalism may exist in a plural society with and 
without a federal legal arrangement.83  
82 W. S. Livingston, ‘A Note On The Nature Of Federalism’, p.86.
83 Arend Lijphart, ‘Consociational Democracy’, World Politics, 1969, pp.207–208; Daniel Elazar, 
Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa and London, The University of Alabama Press, 1991, p.21.
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As mentioned earlier the ruling coalition party, as well as the current 
opposition coalition party, manifests the consociational feature of Malaysian 
politics.84 
ii) The political landscape post-2008 General Election
In the 2008 General Elections BN lost five states and was deprived of its 
two-thirds majority in Parliament. Interesting events happened in the 
states after the election. A few Malay Rulers, who have the prerogative in 
appointing the Chief Minister, played an active role to determine who should 
be appointed. This can be seen in Terengganu85 and Perlis86 where the Chief 
Ministers suggested by the Federal Prime Minister were turned down by the 
Rulers and other suitable candidates were appointed. This is an example to 
indicate that the Malay Rulers and the states are being bold and beginning 
to flex their muscles.
84 The National Front or Barisan Nasional, formerly known as the Alliance Party, is a coalition or 
confederation of fourteen component parties which represent almost all segments of the people 
of Malaysia. Each component party of the coalition claims to represent at least one ethnic or sub-
ethnic group. The backbone of Barisan is the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which 
represents the Malays of the Peninsula. Other major parties of the Peninsula are the Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA), which represents the Chinese and the Malaysian Indian Congress 
(MIC), which represents the Indians of West Malaysia. The influence of Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia 
(GRM or GERAKAN), which is dominated by Chinese is mainly confined to the state of Penang, 
while the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), which receives support from the Indians and Chinese, 
currently seems to be insignificant. The remaining parties of the coalition are based either in Sabah 
or Sarawak. In Sarawak, the Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB) represents the Malays and 
Melanau, Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) represents the Chinese, Sarawak National Party 
(SNAP) represents the Iban and the Parti Bangsa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) represents the Dayaks. 
In Sabah, the Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) can be said to 
represent the Chinese, and Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat (AKAR), Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS), 
Parti Demokratik Sabah (PDS) and UMNO represent the natives including the Malays. UMNO’s 
President automatically becomes the President of Barisan Nasional while the president of each 
component party becomes the Vice-Chairman of Barisan Nasional.
85 ‘UMNO vs. the Royalty’, http://www1.malaysiakini.com/news/80594, March 30, 2008.
86 ‘Perlis welcomes new Menteri Besar’, http://www1.malaysiakini.com/news/79943 , March 17, 2008.
Opposition-controlled states were also mulling about restoring local 
government elections. Penang took a further step by going to court to 
compel the Election Commission and the Federal Government to hold local 
authority elections in the state. The Penang Pakatan Rakyat government has 
been taking steps to try to restore local government elections in the state to 
return the third vote to the people. Local council elections used to be held in 
the country, and Malaysians got to elect their local councillors between 1951 
and 1965. The local government elections were suspended in 1965 because 
of the Indonesian Confrontation. The Penang State Government filed an 
application for leave to petition the Federal Court to declare that the Penang 
state legislature has a right to hold local government elections in accordance 
with the Local Government Elections (Penang Island and Province Wellesley) 
Enactment 2012 which was passed by the State Assembly. The court 
granted them leave to file the petition to challenge provisions of the Local 
Government Act 1976, which prevent the holding of local government 
elections. The petition will be heard before a Bench of the Federal Court.
It could be said that the main beneficiaries of the recent election in 2008 and 
2013 are the two states of East Malaysia which helped the BN to retain its 
position at the federal level. The Barisan Nasional within Peninsular Malaysia 
failed to obtain the majority of popular votes cast. It only obtained 49 per 
cent of the popular votes in Peninsular Malaysia whereas the Opposition 
had the majority of popular votes — 51 per cent. UMNO won 35 per cent 
of popular votes against 34.8 per cent won by PAS and Keadilan. Although 
the Barisan Nasional won 140 seats in Parliament, fifty-four seats came 
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from Sabah and Sarawak. So, without Sabah and Sarawak, Barisan Nasional 
would not even have obtained a simple majority in Parliament. The political 
conditions are therefore really favourable for the two states, which, being the 
kingmaker of the federal government, could demand more local autonomy 
and significant roles at the federal level. 
Overall the ‘political tsunami’ which occurred in 2008, and to a certain extent 
was repeated in 2013, have rejuvenated the state’s autonomy and provided 
opportunities for the states to decentralised power in the Federation.
CONCLUSION
Federalism can be described as the process by which two or more 
governments share powers over the same geographic area. The method 
of sharing power is outlined in the federal constitution binding on all 
governments. In the relationship between the federal government and the 
state government there are pulling factors (which pull the states towards 
the central government) that make the country centralised, and pushing 
factors (which push the states further from the central government) that 
cause the country to be decentralised. The centripetal and centrifugal factors 
which vary in degrees constantly in the Malaysian federal system manifest 
the dynamics of federalism. They allow the relationships between the 
governments to respond to the changing needs and aspirations of the various 
communities. As any other country in this world Malaysia is not a country 
with a perfect record. There are serious concerns relating to safeguards 
of state rights and autonomy. Nevertheless the Federal Constitution has 
survived various tremendous challenges since its birth with some major 
and minor modifications. The federal system which has been adopted has 
its own significant roles in perpetuating democratic ideals in the country 
and maintaining unity.
The leaders especially must have mutual respect and courtesy among 
themselves and to the people. As role models the leaders must show great 
respect to the law and constitution. They must comply with the letter of the 
law and uphold the spirit and philosophy of the constitution. In order to 
strive for greater stability and security, instead of using repressive security 
laws with little or no concern for individual rights, good governance must 
be observed in all aspects of administration. This will protect the integrity 
of the governing authority and enable the government to govern with full 
authority because it can claim to have political, legal and moral legitimacy. 
